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US bulk energy providers must now report attempted breaches

US bulk energy providers must now report attempted breaches as well as successful breaches. Guidance is murky over what constitutes an “attempted” breach.

One of the most pernicious aspects of the far-reaching and potentially devastating SolarWinds supply chain hack is that it successfully evaded detection for at least ten months by hiding inside seemingly normal software operations. The hack of SolarWinds’ Orion product enabled Russian actors to embed surveillance malware into widely used management software. It pushed the so-called SUNBURST malware deep into public and private networks using the invisibility cloak of ordinary activity, causing no harm or disruption as it silently operated.

The SolarWinds hack is largely considered a turbo-charged nation-state espionage campaign. Most experts, however, won’t rule out that out the possibility that the Russian intelligence team behind the breach weren’t also paving the way for attacks that could damage operations. One of the biggest concerns about the hack’s impact is how it affected the nation’s power grid.

New regulations aimed at spotting attempted compromises in the power grid that don’t cause damage, like SolarWinds, went into effect on January 1, 2021. It’s not at all clear that the new requirements will help the energy industry spot these kinds of attacks.

This article appeared in CSO Online. To read the rest of the article please visit here.

 

 

Articles

New CISA director outlines top 5 priorities for protecting…

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CISA’s Christopher Krebs has a two-year plan for his new cybersecurity agency, with China, supply chain and 5G as top priorities.
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Last November, the former, somewhat awkwardly named National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) was elevated within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to become the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) following enactment of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018. CISA is responsible for protecting the country’s critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats, overseeing a host of cybersecurity-related activities. This includes operating the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), which provides round-the-clock situational awareness, analysis, incident response and cyber defense capabilities to the federal government, state, local, tribal and territorial governments, the private sector and international partners.

CISA made its first prominent mark as an independent agency during the 35-day government shut-down when, on January 22, it issued an unexpected, and to some a startling, emergency directive ordering admins at most government agencies to protect their domains against a wave of attacks on the domain name system infrastructure (DNS). The directive was prompted by a number of DNS tampering efforts at multiple executive branch agencies. This malicious, complex and widespread campaign, dubbed DNSpionage by Cisco Talos, allowed suspected Iranian hackers to steal massive amounts of email passwords and other sensitive data from government offices and private sector entities.

Christopher Krebs serves as CISA’s first director. Krebs previously headed the NPPD as assistant secretary for infrastructure protection and joined DHS as a senior counselor to the secretary after working in the U.S. Government Affairs team as the director for cybersecurity at Microsoft.

This article appeared in CSO Online. To read the rest of the article please visit here.